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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents results of Monte Carlo simulation of the 
Retirement-for-Cause (RFC) engine maintenance system as developed by 
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft and the U. S. Air Force. The Retirement-
for-Cause concept is addressed, conventional Monte Carlo modeling 
techniques are explained, and an alternative approach developed at 
Pratt and Whitney is presented. Next, a simplified non-ideal Non-
Destructive-Evaluation (NDE) model with fixed probabilities of Type 
I and Type II errors is described and simulation results obtained 
using this model are presented and discussed. An appendix presents 
a survey of various methods used to model NDE. 
RETIREMENT-FOR-CAUSE 
The fatigue process is often considered conceptually to be 
comprised of initiation and propagation phases, with the initiation 
phase exhibiting the greater variability. During initiation, small 
microcracks develop, grow, and eventually link up to form a crack, 
which would then propagate subcritically until the combination of 
service load (stress) and crack size exceeds the material fracture 
toughness. Catastrophic failure would result had not the component 
been retired from service. To preclude such failures, rotating 
components are typically retired at a time when 1 in 1000 (for 
example) could be expected to have developed a short fatigue crack. 
By definition then, 99.9 percent of the retired parts still have 
useful life remaining at the time they are removed from service. 
Under the Retirement-for-Cause philosophy, each of these components 
could be inspected and returned to service if no crack was found to 
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have initiated. The Return-to-Service (RTS) interval is determined 
from a fracture mechanics calculation of the remaining propagation 
life from a crack just small enough to have been missed during 
inspection. This procedure could be repeated until some measurable 
damage had accrued to the part, at which time it would be retired 
for that reason (cause). Parts would be retired for having incurred 
quantifiable damage, rather than because an analytically predeter-
mined minimum design life had been exceeded. The goal here is safe 
utilization of inherent component life capacity, not life extension. 
NDE must provide the means of screening disks with flaws that 
could cause component failure within an economically feasible RTS 
interval. NDE capability with acceptable flaw detection resolution 
has been available for some time, but adequate reliability of flaw 
detection has been lacking, Complementary inspections and recent 
improvement in NDE single inspection reliability (by automation), 
can now provide the required reliability for many gas turbine engine 
components to utilize economically the RFC maintenance concept. 
Since any real inspection will of neccessity result in a cer-
tain number of Type I (misses) and Type II (false calls) errors, the 
effect of these errors must be determined. A Monte Carlo simulator 
modeling the inspection system and life cycle behavior for engine 
disks has been developed which allows for statistical variations in 
component behavior and simulates the effect of various parameters on 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC). The effects of non-ideal NDE on life cycle 
cost using a simple delta function model were examined using this 
simulator. 
A conventional Monte Carlo simulator follows each engine disk 
as it is inspected, returned to service, reinspected, and so on. The 
Probabalistic Life Analysis Technique (PLAT) simulator developed at 
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft is of this type. The collective behavior 
of new disks however, obscured investigation into the behavior of 
older disks since there was no simple way of determining the rela-
tive proportions of disk ages in any given RTS interval. Further-
more, it can be seen that as the entire population progresses 
through time, an ever increasing proportion of computer time is 
spent simulating the behavior of new disks, essentially a redundant 
exercise. 
SIMULATION TECHNIQUE 
A new technique which models the life cycle without disk 
replacement has been developed, the PLAT-2 simulator. At first 
glance, this would appear to defeat the purpose of Retirement-for-
Cause entirely, since the concept is based on disk replacement when 
a specified damage criterion is met. This apparent problem, how-
ever, is easily disposed of; the simulator is broken into two func-
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tional parts. In Part 1, the specified number of disks is tracked 
through the several inspection intervals. Since no disks are 
replaced when they are retired (or fail) the in-service population 
becomes smaller with each successive RTS interval. This provides 
the relative frequency or probability of disk rejection, the proba-
bility of failure, and the probability of error for disks after 1, 
2, ... n service intervals. An additional computational benefit 
also accrues: as more discs are removed from service, the computer 
time required decreases since new disks are not being re-simulated. 
The results from Part I and the laws of probability are then used in 
Part II to generate the same results obtained by the PLAT simulator 
which required significantly more computer time. The resolution 
developed in the distribution tails is greatly increased since a 
much larger population of older components was sampled from. In 
addition, the effect of non-constant fleet size or varying RTS 
interval can be simulated easily. 
MODELING NDE WITHIN CONTEXT OF RFC 
Perfect NDE consists of an ideal step function with the step 
at the inspection crack size, a-insp, as shown in Figure 1. All 
cracks smaller than a-insp will be passed by the inspectiQn process, 
while the cracks larger than a-insp will be rejected. Unfortun-
ately, this is never the case in reality. 
There are various approaches to modeling non-ideal inspection. 
Three major types of models have been used, viz: Probability-of-
detection (POD)* vs. crack size (a); indicated crack size (a-hat) 
vs. actual crack size; and a probability distribution of normalized 
crack size (a-hat/a). These models are treated more fully in the 
Appendix. 
The approach taken in the investigations described here util-
izes a step function, but no longer assumes either zero or 100% 
POD. By making approximation that a constant percentage of all 
cracks smaller than a-insp will be detected (and the part rejected, 
resulting in a Type II error) and a constant percentage of all 
cracks larger than a-insp will be missed (and the part passed, 
:-r.---------
>< Besuner and Rau of Failure Analysis Associates, Palo Alto, CA, 
correctly point out that Probability of ~~!~£!!~~ is a misnomer. A 
more correct term would be Probability of Bgig£!i2ll, since many 
surface anomolies (eg: scratches, wear, machining marks) can be 
"detected" without their leading to a component's rejection. POD, 
however, appears to be the more common term and will be used here 
with the understanding that detection subsequently requires 
component rejection. 
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resulting in a Type I error) provides a very simple model which 
describes non-ideal inspection results. An additional advantage of 
this description is that it eliminates the need to model the 
shape of the POD curve. In modeling a non-ideal inspection the 
shape of the middle of the curve can vary greatly; an infinite 
number of curves may be drawn through any three points selected, 
while the step function model allows only one curve to be drawn 
through the three points. Using this approach avoids a costly 
parametric evaluation of rise time, the effects of which depend 
greatly upon the underlying distribution of crack sizes being 
inspected. The curves used in this investigation are shown in 
Figure 2. 
CONSEQUENCES OF IMPERFECT NDE 
For the purposes of this paper, several ground rules were 
adopted. Simulation of ~FC situations would result in very few 
interesting occurrences (disk failures, disk removals, errors) since 
the purpose of RFC is to prevent failures by removing those few 
which might be candidates. Conditions were therefore intentionally 
biased to increase the number of these salient occurrences. There-
fore, a short propagation life (relative to the return-to-service 
interval), a low initiation life (relative to total disk life) and a 
low propagation margin were selected. (Propagation margin is the 
ratio of propagation life to RTS interval.) 
The results presented here are ~QI, therefore, representative 
of actual engine conditions, but were selected to demonstrate the 
influence of NDE fa:>-lability on Retirement-for-Cause. 
Two conclusions are drawn concerning the effect of Type I 
errors during the disk lifetime. First, Type I errors increase with 
time as shown in Figures 3 through 6. The incidence of error 
increases even though the probability of error, given that a crack 
exists, is constant. This is because the mode of the cracksize 
distribution increases over time as the fatigue process progresses. 
These figures are comparison plots over the eight inspections simu-
lated showing percent Type I eirors occurring within each interval; 
three levels of probability of Type I errors (0%, 10%, and 20%) at a 
given level of probability of Type II errors (eg: 5% in Figure 3.) 
are presented. It can also be seen from a comparison of the four 
figures that the probability of Type II error has little effect on 
Type I error. Only when the probability of any removal is very high 
does the incidence of failures due to Type I error diminish. Fig-
ures 7 through 10 show the effect of varying Type I and Type II 
probability on disk failure rate. As expected, increased Type I 
probability results in increased disk failures, or alternatively, 
requires shorter RTS intervals to maintain a constant failure rate. 
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The principal effect of Type II errors is to increase life 
cycle cost. Since Type II errors result in disk removals, the 
number of replacement disks must increase as a result of these 
errors. This effect can be seen in Figures 11 through 14 which show 
percent removals in each interval for the given NDE capabilities. 
Reference to Figure 7 through 10 shows that Type II errors also 
have a minimal effect on disk failure rate. 
Notice that the figures do not include the effect of disk 
replacements over the life cycle. Previous efforts to show the 
effects of Type I and Type II errors on an entire population which 
included other effects created by disk replacement were largely 
unsuccessful; the replacement disks obscured the results. The fig-
ures showing the effect of inspection correlation referenced in the 
following discussion do however, include the effect of disk replace-
ment during the life cycle since this was the area of concern. 
The correlation between successive inspections at the same disk 
location was also·considered. Successive inspections of the same 
disk location are not independent; there is some degree of correla-
tion between the probability of finding a crack in succeding inspec-
tions. A recent paper (Yang, 1982) investigating the effect of 
totally independent inspections concludes that there is little prob-
ability of a disk surviving an inspection due to the cumulative 
effect of independent Type II errors. Were this actually the case, 
throughput at overhaul centers would approach zero. This has not 
been seen. Figures 15 through 17 show the effect of varying the 
correlation between subsequent inspections. Assuming the inspec-
tions are totally uncorrelated greatly increases the replacement 
rate over cases assuming no correlation, or cases assuming a 50% 
correlation. (Remember, this correlation is for subsequent inspec-
tions of the same disk - with the POD vs. a relationship treated as 
representing an entire disk - and not single, independent inspec-
tions of multiple locations on a single disk.) 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, P~COMMENDATIONS 
In summary. several points can be made: 
1. It is possible to tolerate (at the price of shorter Return-
to-Service intervals and increased inspection cost) less than ideal 
NDE and still have a viable RFC procedure: 
2. The effect of changing NDE reliability is more clearly seen 
when the results are not obscured by disk replacements. 
3. Increasing probability of Type I error requires shorter RTS 
interval to maintain constant failure rate; incidence of Type I 
error increases with time for constant error probability. 
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4. Increasing probability of Type II error diminishes the 
chance of a part's being returned to service, increases overall cost 
of inspection, but has minimal effect on failure rate. 
5. RFC results are influenced by assumptions about the correla-
tion between subsequent inspections of the same part; increasing 
correlation decreases the overall incidence of Type II error and 
removal rate. 
Areas recommended for future work include: 
1. Research into the exact degree of correlation between suc-
cessive inspections at the same disk location; 
2. Further quantification of this effect on the RFC process; 
3. Increased use of binary data analysis techniques for coef-
ficient evaluation in modeling the POD vs. a relationship, including 
an investigation of the influence of the functional model used. 
APPENDIX 
Because RFC is greatly influenced by fac'tors other than NDE 
(eg: uncertainties in mission usage, fatigue behavior, stress 
analysis and life prediction) and because imperfect NDE is a conven-
ient scapegoat for possible RFC difficulties, perfect NDE has been 
used, until recently, in the simulation of the Retirement-for-Cause 
system. Cracks larger than the inspection crack size will be 
rejected; cracks smaller than inspection crack size will be passed. 
Various NDE models were considered for this investigation. 
Perhaps the oldest method of describing NDE reliability is to 
quote a crack size for which there is a 90% probability of detection 
with a statistical confidence level of 95%, a-90/95. Since this 
approach does not describe the NDE behavior at crack sizes smaller 
(or larger) than a-90/95, it cannot be used for RFC decisions. 
Furthermore, recent scrutiny of the mathematical statistics used in 
determining this parameter from a finite amount of data indicates 
that its expected variability makes it of little practical value in 
providing even a qualitative assessment of NDE reliability (Berens, 
1982). 
Perhaps the most common approach to quantitative NDE modeling 
is the POD - a relationship. Conventionally, data are presented as 
the fraction of cracks within a specific size range which were 
detected, POD, plotted against crack size, a. Various algebraic 
models are then used to describe this relationship using regression 
techniques to evaluate the model coefficients. Often some lineariz-
ing transformation is made to simplify the regression analysis. 
48 C. G. ANNIS, Jr. ET AL. 
When data are available in copious quantities, this approach is 
acceptable, and is relatively easy to use. However, when there is a 
paucity of data the scheme of grouping data according to crack size 
range becomes untenable. For example, consider 30 individual 
inspections of differing crack sizes. Grouping into three size 
ranges would provide ten percentage points of resolution on the POD 
axis, but results in gross size resolution. Any trade-off to 
improve resolution of crack size is at the expense of resolution in 
POD. Worst of all, in any event there are only three POD, a points 
available for the regression, a woefully insufficient number for even 
a two-parameter (eg: linear) model. 
An alternative approach to determining model coefficients is to 
use binary data analysis and the maximum likelihood method. POD 
data are treated as either 0 (component accepted) or 1 (component 
rejected). Any model describing the POD vs. a relationship can be 
postulated; usually a two parameter model is adequate. The model 
coefficients are then evaluated using the maximum likelihood method 
for determining coefficients which maximize the probability (likeli-
hood) of obtaining the observed POD· ~ data pairs. Various 
functional forms of the POD, a model have been evaluated using this 
technique, which shows great promise. 
Under Retirement-for-Cause, the decision to return a part to 
service will be based not on how large a crack actually is, but on 
the size it ~EE~~!2 to be. A second method for NDE modeling 
directly addresses this sizing problem. By plotting the indicated 
crack size on the y-axis vs. actual crack size on the x-axis as 
shown in Figure 18, the variability in this decision parameter 
becomes apparent. This procedure does not avoid the necessity of 
modeling, however, since some relation between apparent and actual 
sizes must be determined. Often a linear relationship suffices. It 
should be remembered that other methods of modeling NDE do not avoid 
the sizing problem but treat it implicitly. For example, the POD 
vs. a relationship considers detections which require subsequent 
rejection. 
A third method is to "normalize" the indicated crack size by 
dividing by actual crack size. The resulting non-dimensional repre-
sentation can be illustrated by a probability plot as shown in 
Figure 19. Symbol sizes in this figure represent the relationship 
of actual crack sizes to each other. By sampling from this dis-
tribution a POD vs. a curve may be generated. This method has been 
used to model mean eddy current capability in the Retirement for 
Cause simulator with some success, since the simulator keeps track 
of actual crack size. Multiplying the ratio obtained from sampling 
the distribution by actual crack size gives "indicated cra~k size" 
for simulation purposes. 
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DISCUSSION 
S. Bush (Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratory): I'd like to make 
an analogy of what we just heard. In regard to aircraft gas tur-
bines, I ~ight comment that the same problem currently exists on 
somewhat larger turbines, namely large steam turbines. One of the 
aspects of this is the hypothetical example that's not supposed to 
happen for aircraft gas turbines--namely, a very short initial 
period in some instances and a variable crack growth rate. One 
aspect then, of course, is that you can vary the time interval for 
your nondestructive examinations, and in your case, you were ap-
parently holding them constant. A time interval change can have 
some obvious impacts, too. Have you investigated this particular 
one with regard to the effect on type 1 or type 2 errors? 
C.G. Annis (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft): You are right, the interval 
itself can have a big influence, especially as a part gets older. 
For the sake of simplicity today, I've kept that constant to see 
how it affected the other variables in which we were interested. 
R.B. Thompson (Ames Laboratory): In your conclusions, you said that 
the survival probability approach to a constant after several in-
spection intervals is independent of the NDE--
C.G. Annis: I didn't mean to say independent of the NDE. It is in-
dependent for a given value of NDE that approaches the statewide, 
not necessarily the same place. 
